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HOW THE USA PATRIOT ACT WILL PERMIT GOVERNMENTAL
INFRINGEMENT UPON THE PRIVACY OF AMERICANS
IN THE NAME OF "INTELLIGENCE" INVESTIGATIONS
SHARON H. RACKOW'
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, as Americans watched time
and again the news footage of airplanes crashing into the World
Trade Center in New York City, many resolved to support the Bush
administration in its efforts to find the terrorists responsible for those
horrific actions and bring them to justice-at whatever cost necessary.
Mourning the loss of so many lives, and faced with warnings of addi-
tional terrorist attacks, Americans called for legislative action in the
hope that new laws would grant the government sufficient surveillance
capabilities to catch terrorists hiding on U.S. soil, thereby leading to
greater security at home. "An ABC-Washington Post poll taken the day
after September 11th found that two out of three Americans are will-
ing to surrender civil liberties to stop terrorism. 2
Private citizens were not alone in their desire for legislative re-
form. Immediately after September 11th, the Bush administration ad-
vocated radical amendments to existing law to allow intelligence and
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law enforcement agencies access to the essential tools' required to un-
cover terrorist activity in the United States. As the House of Represen-
tatives and Senate began to d4ate the proposals promoted by Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft, concerns emerged regarding the extent to
which these new provisions would infringe upon cherished civil liber-
ties. As the House's Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("PATRIOT Act") 4 and the Sen-
ate's comparable Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001
("USA Act")5 began to take shape under the Bush administration's
"'relentless' pressure to move quickly, 'without deliberation or de-
bate," 6 it became apparent that several provisions of the bills would
permit the government to intrude upon the private lives of law-
abiding Americans-without assurance of any greater security against
terrorism. The American Civil Liberties Union expressed its view in a
letter to the Senate, commenting that:
While it contains provisions that we support, the American Civil Liberties
Union believes that the USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney General
and federal law enforcement unnecessary and permanent new powers to
violate civil liberties that go far beyond the stated goal of fighting inter-
national terrorism. These new and unchecked powers could be used
against American citizens who are not under criminal investigation, im-
migrants who are here within our borders legally, and also against those
whose First Amendment activities are deemed to be threats to national
security by the Attorney General.7
Despite such concerns, on October 26, 2001, President George W.
Bush signed the House and Senate's compromise antiterrorism bill,
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
3 During the time that the House and Senate were creating what would become
the USA PATRIOT Act, "Attorney General John D. Ashcroft characterized the anti-
terrorism bill as a package of 'tools' urgently needed to combat terrorism." Jim
McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making-Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Domestic
Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4.
4 H.R. 2975, 107th Cong. (2001).
5 S. 1510, 107th Cong. (2001).
6 Adam Clymer, Bush Set to Sign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al (quoting Sen.
Feingold); see also 147 CONG. REc. S10,366 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("We have expedited the legislative process in the Judiciary Committee to con-
sider the administration's proposals. In daily news conferences, the Attorney General
has referred to the need for such prompt consideration.").
7 Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Office, and Gregory
T. Nojeim, Associate Director & Chief Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to the United States
Senate (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l10230] k.html.
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("USA PATRIOT Act").s
One multifaceted aspect of the USA PATRIOT Act that has re-
ceived a great deal of criticism from both civil libertarians and the
press alike is the broad expansion of the government's right to engage
in electronic surveillance. This Comment addresses how three dis-
crete provisions of the Act allow the government far greater power to:
(1) monitor the private telephone conversations of individuals sus-
pected of purely domestic criminal activity, without demonstrating
probable cause that a crime has been or is soon to be committed, un-
der the guise of an "intelligence" investigation; (2) overhear private
conversations of nonsuspects permitted by the extension of roving
wiretap authority to foreign intelligence investigations without proper
privacy protections; and (3) discourage political dissent by including
the activities of unpopular political organizations within the newly
created definition of "domestic terrorism."
By enacting these three provisions, the USA PATRIOT Act dis-
rupts the delicate inherent in our established surveillance laws,9 which
prior to September 11th provided the government with sufficient lee-
way to conduct both criminal and intelligence surveillance while pro-
tecting Americans' Fourth and First Amendment rights to be free
from "unreasonable searches and seizures"'0 and to exercise freedom
of expression." Through a review of Fourth and First Amendment
rights, an analysis of pre-USA PATRIOT Act surveillance law, and a
discussion of how three provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act greatly
increase the government's surveillance abilities, this Comment illus-
trates how the USA PATRIOT Act allows the government to compro-
mise cherished freedoms the American people 12 both enjoy and cele-
brate as part of our national identity.
8 H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
9 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (1994); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811
(1994).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12 The USA PATRIOT Act affects the rights of United States citizens and nonciti-
zens differently, a distinction which is beyond the scope of this Comment. Therefore
this Comment focuses exclusively on how the Act infringes on American citizens'
Fourth and First Amendment rights.
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I. REVIEW OF FOURTH AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The Fourth Amendment
The strongest protection Americans have against governmental
intrusions into their privacy interests is the Fourth Amendment, which
provides that "[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated."1 3 Early interpretations of the Amend-
ment tended toward a literal and narrow reading of the wording, such
that it protected only physical property interests. An example of this
property-based application is Boyd v. United States, in which the Court
found that compelled production of a person's private papers consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 14 To reach this conclusion, the Court heavily re-
lied upon the English case of Entick v. Carrington,"5 finding Lord Cam-
den's pronouncement of the judgment to be "sufficiently explanatory
of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures." 6 In Entick,
the English court stated that:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an in-
spection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of
a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away the se-
cret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and
demand more considerable damages in that respect.17
The Boyd Court reasoned that "[i]t is not the breaking of [a man's]
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and private property ... which underlies
and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment."
18
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). The property rights conception of the Fourth
Amendment is clearly abrogated by currentjurisprudence after the Katz v. United States
decision, discussed infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
15 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB. 1765), in 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029.
16 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. "As every American statesman.., was undoubtedly famil-
iar with this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate
expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions
were in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion .... Id. at 626-27.
17 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K-B. 1765), in 19 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1029; see also Boyd,
116 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting this passage in full).
18 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
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Property notions also controlled cases concerning electronic sur-
veillance such as Olmstead v. United States, in which the Court ruled
that the wiretap in question did not violate the appellant's Fourth
Amendment rights.' 9 The Court reasoned that there could be no
search when there was no physical invasion of the appellant's personal
space, and likewise there could be no seizure considering that words
are not tangible things capable of being seized.0 Yet Justice Bran-
deis's dissent signaled a shift in attitude away from such unyielding
property-based applications of the Fourth Amendment when he
stated:
The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone .... To pro-
tect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.2'
In describing the right conferred by the Fourth Amendment as the
right "to be let alone," Justice Brandeis was referring to the influential
article he had written with Samuel D. Warren, entitled The Right to Pri-
vacy, which argued for common law recognition of a fundamental
right to privacy.2
Thirty-nine years after Olmstead, the Court again faced an elec-
tronic surveillance controversy in Katz v. United States, in which FBI
agents-acting without a warrant-set up a wiretap by attaching a lis-
tening device to the outside of a public telephone booth from which
the appellant was engaging in illegal bookmaking activities.2 Influ-
enced by notions of privacy, the Court held that "[t] he Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."24 In a concurring
19 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
20 See id. at 464 ("There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants.").
21 Id. at 478 (Brandeis,J, dissenting).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890) ("Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of soci-
ety.").
23 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
24 Id. at 353.
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opinion, Justice Harlan created a two-part test to determine when the
Fourth Amendment, which the Court declared "protects people, not
places,', actually confers such protection. Justice Harlan explained
that "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.' 2" This opinion, which was later accepted by a majority of the
Court, 7 demonstrates a clear shift in the Court's interpretation of the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, away from property-
based conceptions and toward privacy-based notions. Privacy as pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment denotes a right to be free from un-
warranted governmental surveillance, and such privacy interests
should be kept in mind when considering the implications of the USA
PATRIOT Act.
B. The First Amendment
Governmental surveillance also may infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of Americans by chilling free expression, particu-
larly in the context of political protest. The First Amendment pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech. " ' s This explicit constitutional protection of expressive activity
is upheld with particular vigor when individuals exercise this freedom
as a means of political protest. While many forms of expressive activi-
ties are protected by the First Amendment, the courts have allowed
little or no protection for those who seek to incite violence,2 or who
use violence or otherwise illegal acts as a means of protest.30 As the
Supreme Court declared in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., "'vio-
lence has no sanctuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weap-
25 Id. at 351.
26 Id. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
27 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (restating and applying
the test from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) ("[Tlhe
constitutional guarantee[] of free speech ... do[es] not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.").
30 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("'[V]iolence or other
types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection."' (quoting
Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984))).
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ons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade
under the guise of "advocacy."' 31 Since violent or illegal acts are not
protected under the right to free expression, the First Amendment
will not act as a barrier against government surveillance of such activi-
ties. Yet, where individuals exercise free expression in a manner pro-
tected by the First Amendment, government surveillance may not be
targeted specifically at such behavior. Interests protected by the First
and Fourth Amendments converge in this context, as intrusive surveil-
lance activities discourage the exercise of protected expression.33 In
United States v. United States District Court, the Court stated that
"[h]istory abundantly documents the tendency of Government-how-
ever benevolent and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those
who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protec-
tions become the more necessary when the targets of official surveil-
lance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political be-
liefs." 3 4  Thus, although the framers' motives in developing and
passing the USA PATRIOT Act were almost certainly benevolent-in
that they were seeking to safeguard national security and protect
Americans from further terrorist attacks-it is important to consider
carefully how the Act will permit government surveillance of targets
exercising protected free expression.
II. PRE-USA PATRIOT ACT SURVEILLANCE LAW: TITLE III AND FISA
Prior to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title 
III") 35
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 36 pro-
vided United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies exten-
31 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1970)
(Douglas, J., concurring)).
32 As the Supreme Court remarked in United States v. United States District Court:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an un-
checked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official
eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government
action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public
discourse, is essential to our free society.
407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
3 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Sur-
veillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000) ("Whatever the surveillance technique, do-
mestic security surveillance may also chill the free expression protected by the First
Amendment.").
34 407 U.S. at 314.
35 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
36 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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sive surveillance authority in a wide range of circumstances. And yet,
proponents of the USA PATRIOT Act pushed for the swift passage of
this controversial piece of legislation-claiming that expanded gov-
ernmental surveillance authority would be an essential weapon in
combating the immediate threat of terrorism 7 _Without first inquir-
ing into how the Act would disrupt the delicate balance struck with Ti-
tle III and FISA. Only with a thorough understanding of the precur-
sors to, purposes of, authority granted by, and protections afforded
under Title III and FISA can one begin to understand the far-reaching
and unwarranted surveillance authority bestowed upon law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies by the USA PATRIOT Act.
A. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
Title III was the legislative response to the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in Katz v. United States, where the Court, influenced by
notions of privacy, established that governmental interception of an
individual's telephone conversation, conducted without the target's
consent, constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.38 Although the Katz decision definitively barred
warrantless governmental surveillance in the context of criminal inves-
tigations, in a highly controversial footnote the Court left the door
open for warrantless surveillance in circumstances concerning na-
tional security. 9 In a concurring opinionJustice White indicated that
the Supreme Court should not require the President to obtain a war-
rant for national security matters where the President had determined
the reasonableness of the surveillance. 4° Troubled by Justice White's
statement, Justice Douglasjoined by justice Brennan, responded:
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In mat-
ters where they believe national security may be involved they are not de-
tached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be ....
The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast
in the role of adversary, in national security cases .... Since spies and
saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as
suspected gamblers ... I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are
37 See Clymer, supra note 6, at Al ("'The president is pleased that Congress has
acted quickly to provide additional tools in fighting the war on terrorism ... ' (quot-
ing Claire Buchan, Deputy Press Secretary to the President).
38 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
39 "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question
not presented by this case." Id. at 358 n.23.
40 Id. at 364 (White,J., concurring).
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involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured
when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of
adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
Although the Court would not address the executive branch's author-
ity in approving intelligence surveillance for another five years, this
early dialogue presented a preview to the forthcoming debate con-
cerning this greatly contested matter.
Responding to the majority holding of Katz, Congress enacted Ti-
tle III as a means to implement a uniform procedure for conducting
constitutionally acceptable electronic surveillance. Title III authorizes
law enforcement agents to engage in surveillance activities for crimi-
nal investigative purposes upon a judge's finding of probable cause
that a serious crime 42 has been or is about to be committed, and an
award of a warrant -in compliance with the Fourth Amendment's
directive. Generally, all criminal surveillance must be authorized by a
judge of competent jurisdiction.44 In an emergency situation,45 how-
ever, where there is immediate danger of death or serious injury to
any person, conspiratorial activities threatening the national security
interest, or conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime,46
law enforcement may engage in warrantless wiretapping, so long as an
application for a warrant is made within forty-eight hours of the com-
mencement of interception. 7
The congressional findings accompanying Title III clearly illus-
trate Congress's dual intent in creating this extensive piece of legisla-
tion: "to promote more effective control of crime while protecting
the privacy of individual thought and expression." 48 The findings in-
dicate that:
(c) Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communi-
cations in their criminal activities. The interception of such communica-
41 Id. at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Brennan,J.).
42 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (enumerating the types of offenses
for which a wiretap may be granted).
43 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a) (1994).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1994); seealso 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
45 An emergency must be reasonably determined as such "by any investigative or
law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, the Deputy At-
torney General, the Associate Attorney General, or by the principal prosecuting attor-
ney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State." 18
U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1994).
46 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (a) (iii) (1994).
47 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1994).
48 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972).
2002] 1659
1660 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA IAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1651
tions to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their
commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the admini-
stration ofjustice.
(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communi-
cation has consented to the interception should be allowed only when
authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain un-
der the control and supervision of the authorizing court .... 4C
The probable cause requirement of Title III is integral to the pro-
tection of individual privacy from the invasive nature of wiretaps and
is a particularly important concept to appreciate in comparing Title
III and FISA since FISA does not require that this protective element
be demonstrated to the court before surveillance authority is granted.
Meeting the probable cause requirement of Title III is a substantial
threshold that the applicant for wiretap authority must reach to the
satisfaction of the reviewing judge before such intrusive authority will
be permitted.5 0 To protect against unreasonable searches and seizures
as provided by the Fourth Amendment, Title III explicitly requires
that the judge ascertain the existence of probable cause "that an indi-
vidual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particu-
lar offense",5 before granting wiretap authority. In United States District
Court, the Supreme Court elaborated on the importance of the prob-
able cause requirement in stating that it is the "very heart of the
Fourth Amendment directive: that, where practical, a governmental
search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to
gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's
private... conversation." 2
Although Title III is broad in scope, it is clear that the statute was
not meant to infringe upon the Executive's long-standing surveillance
authority over matters concerning foreign intelligence. As the D.C.
Circuit noted in Chagnon v. Bell, "every President since Franklin D.
Roosevelt has claimed the 'inherent' constitutional power to authorize
warrantless surveillance in cases vitally affecting the national security.
Furthermore, all presidents to hold office since Katz was decided have
49 Act ofJune 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 801, 82 Stat. 211.
50 In an application for wiretap authority, the applicant must provide the court
with information, beyond that needed to establish probable cause, that a crime has
been or is soon to be committed. The information necessary for a wiretap application
is detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
51 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a) (1994).
52 407 U.S. at 316.
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advocated a broad exception to the warrant requirement for surveil-
lance targeted at agents of foreign governments. ,"
3 The original ver-
sion of Title III unequivocally stated:
Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts
of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national secu-
ity information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall any-
thing contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents
of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the Presi-
dent in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence
in any trial hearing or other proceeding only where such interception
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is
necessary to implement that power.54
This initial provision was repealed in 1978, the year FISA was enacted,
and replaced by § 2511(2) (e) and (f), which similarly indicates in per-
tinent part that "[n]othing contained in this chapter... shall be
deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government of
foreign intelligence information from international or foreign com-
munications.
55
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
1. The History Behind FISA
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has a less straightfor-
ward history than Title III. A handful of influential cases addressing
the Executive's power to authorize intelligence surveillance, along
with congressional findings of the executive branch's widespread
abuse of surveillance power authorized for "intelligence purposes,
motivated FISA's promulgation. The first case to bring national atten-
tion to the Executive's intelligence surveillance authority was United
States District Court, in which the Attorney General authorized warrant-
less electronic surveillance of the defendant, a United States citizen
53 642 F.2d 1248, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 197, 214 (repealed 1978).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (1994).
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suspected of conspiring to destroy government property.56 The Attor-
ney General, in his affidavit to the district court, alleged that the wire-
tap of the defendant was employed "'to gather intelligence informa-
tion deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of
the Government.'-5 7 By recognizing § 2511(3) of Title III as leaving
the Executive's authority undisturbed "to employ electronic surveil-
lance to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those who
plot unlawful acts against the Government," the Court distinguished
the power of the executive branch to conduct surveillance for intelli-
gence purposes from the function of Title III as setting forth proce-
dures authorizing surveillance activities in criminal investigations.5 8
Although the Court acknowledged the Executive's intelligence-
gathering authority, it held that the Fourth Amendment does not
permit warrantless wiretaps in cases involving domestic threats to na-
tional security.59 The Court was clear in limiting the scope of its deci-
sion to the surveillance of domestic organizations and thus did not
address whether wiretaps authorized solely by the Executive would be
an acceptable means of gathering intelligence information pertaining
to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.60
Unfettered by judicially imposed constraints on the Executive's
power to authorize surveillance for foreign intelligence investigations,
in the years following United States District Court the Executive tested
the boundaries of his statutory authority-a practice which resulted in
several cases that proved significant in the formation of FISA. Of the
five federal courts of appeals that addressed this controversial subject,
four readily accepted the surveillance power of the Executive, while
the D.C. Circuit refused to follow suit. In determining the legality of
the warrantless wiretaps authorized and employed in each of the fol-
lowing cases, the courts generally focused on whether the primary pur-
pose of the wiretap was to gather foreign intelligence information. If
the primary purpose standard was met, the surveillance was by and
large found to be acceptable.
56 407 U.S. at 299. Although this case arose from a criminal proceeding in which
the United States charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy government
property, the appeal dealt primarily with one defendant who was charged with the dy-
namite bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Id.
57 Id. at 300 (quoting Affidavit of Attorney General John N. Mitchell).
58 Id. at 310.
59 Id. at 320-21.
60 Id. at 308.
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In United States v. Brown, several conversations of the appellant, a
U.S. citizen, were intercepted through the government's electronic
surveillance of other targets, as authorized by the Attorney General."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the wiretaps
of the third party targets were conducted for the sole purpose of gath-
ering foreign intelligence and therefore were legal.62 In supporting
the validity of the Executive's surveillance authority, the court stated,
"because of the President's constitutional duty to act for the United
States in the field of foreign relations, and his inherent power to pro-
tect national security in the context of foreign affairs, we reaffirm...
that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps
for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."
6 3
In United States v. Butenko, a Soviet national and an American citi-
zen appealed their convictions for transmitting to a foreign govern-
ment materials and information relating to the national defense. 
64
The Third Circuit accepted the lower court's decision that the surveil-
lance was within the power of the Executive, as it was primarily de-
signed to determine the leak of sensitive information concerning for-
eign policy and military posture.65 The court endorsed the foreign
intelligence warrant exception by stating, "While we acknowledge that
requiring prior approval of electronic surveillance . . . might have
some salutary effects ... the better course is to rely.., on the good
faith of the Executive .... [A] strong public interest exists: the effi-
cient operation of the Executive's foreign policy-making apparatus
depends on a continuous flow of information." ' The Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Buck, simply cited to Butenko when it acknowledged that
"[f] oreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general
warrant requirement. " 6'
Finally, in United States v. Troung Dinh Hung,8 the Attorney Gen-
eral authorized a massive surveillance 69 of Truong, a Vietnamese citi-
61 484 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
62 Id. at 426-27.
63 Id. at 426.
64 494 F.2d 593, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1974).
65 Id. at 608.
66 Id. at 605.
67 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977).
68 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). Although this case was decided in 1980, the sur-
veillance in question was authorized in 1977, before the enactment of FISA. Id. at 912.
69 "Truong's phone was tapped and his apartment was bugged from May 1977 to
January 1978. The telephone interception continued for 268 days and every conversa-
tion, with possibly one exception, was monitored and virtually all were taped. The
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zen who was known to be passing diplomatic cables and other classi-
fied papers of the United States government's dealings with Southeast
Asia to North Vietnamese government officials. In affirming the dis-
trict court's finding that the executive branch need not always obtain
a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance, the Fourth Circuit
found that "the executive should be excused from securing a warrant
only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelli-
gence reasons .... We ... reject the government's assertion that, if
surveillance is to any degree directed at gathering foreign intelli-
gence, the executive may ignore the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment."
70
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit was the sole federal court of
appeal to find the Executive's warrantless foreign intelligence surveil-
lance authority to be impermissible. 7' Here, the appellants were
members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) 72 who brought an action
against Attorney General John Mitchell and agents of the FBI for con-
ducting illegal electronic surveillance.7 3 Although the Attorney Gen-
eral claimed that the surveillance of the JDL was "essential to protect
this nation and its citizens against hostile acts of a foreign power and
to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the se-
curity of the United States,"74 the court determined that the true and
primary purpose of the extensive surveillance was to provide the gov-
ernment with advance information concerning JDL activities which
"could create a situation of international embarrassment to this coun-
try. " v71 Upon this conclusion, and following an exhaustive review of the
eavesdropping device was operative for approximately 255 days and it ran continu-
ously0" Id. at 912.
Id. at 915.
71 516 F.2d 594, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("We have held that the electronic surveil-
lances involved in this case were illegal because they were executed without a war-
rant.").
72 At the time, the JDL vocally opposed the Soviet government's restrictive emigra-
tion policies relating to Jews within the Soviet Union and engaged in a variety of activi-
ties ranging from peaceful demonstrations to acts of violence to further their goals and
demonstrate their political beliefs. Id. at 608.
73 The telephones of the appellants were wiretapped during the month of October
1970 and from January 5 through June 30, 1971. Id. at 605. Furthermore, "the Gov-
ernment prosecutor admitted that six telephone lines had been involved in the taps
and that there were 'volumes and volumes' of transcripts of intercepted communica-
tions." Id. at 606. During the period that the wiretaps were installed, neither the At-
torney General nor other officials from his office reviewed the information on the
tapes or evaluated the necessity for continuation of the surveillance. Id. at 610.
74 Id. at 607.
75 Id. at 609 n.24.
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historical policy of executive-authorized surveillance76 and prior case
law, the court announced a holding very similar to that of United States
District Court-that a "warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is in-
stalled on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor act-
ing in collaboration with a foreign power, even if the surveillance is
installed under presidential directive in the name of foreign intelli-
gence gathering for protection of the national security."" In dictum,
the court discussed the earlier cases of Brown and Butenko, finding
these courts' analyses wholly inadequate as they simply converted the
Executive's need to gather intelligence information into an absolute
right to conduct warrantless surveillance-without giving sufficient
thought to First and Fourth Amendment interests that may be in-
fringed upon by allowing the Executive to bypass judicial scrutiny.1
8
The court suggested that the proper analysis would ascertain whether
requiring the Executive to obtain a warrant before engaging in intelli-
gence activities would frustrate the acquisition of such information .
In determining that the warrant procedure would not unduly impede
the intelligence gathering function of the Executive, the court ana-
lyzed five possible reasons for exempting the Executive's intelligence
activities from the warrant requirement, finding none sufficiently per-
suasive to justify a warrant exception: (1) the lack of judicial compe-
tence in matters of intelligence surveillance, (2) the danger of security
leaks, (3) the threat of "strategic" information-gathering-the fact
that surveillance tends to be authorized for intelligence purposes
rather than for gathering information of criminal activity, (4) the pos-
sibility that delay would hinder the success of surveillance, and (5) the
administrative burden on the courts and executive branch.0 Based
upon a review of these factors, the plurality opinion expressed the
view that "absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic sur-
veillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional."8'
In addition to Congress's intent to resolve the disagreement be-
76 Although the court recognized the long history of executive-authorized surveil-
lance in situations concerning national security, the court made clear that "this prac-
tice has never received Supreme Court approval, and there can be no doubt that an
unconstitutional practice, no matter how inveterate, cannot be condoned by the judi-
ciary." Id. at 616.
Id. at 614.
78 Id. at 639-41.
79 Id. at 640.
80 See id. at 641-52 (discussing in detail how the listed factors are insufficient to ex-
empt the Executive's intelligence gathering activities from the warrant requirement).
81 Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
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tween the circuits as to the power of the Executive in authorizing in-
telligence surveillance, Congress was further encouraged to clarify and
curtail the intelligence-gathering functions of the Executive once it
was made aware of the executive branch's long-standing and pervasive
abuse of this power. In the early 1970s, the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activi-
ties ("Church Committee") conducted an investigation of the United
States intelligence agencies to determine the extent of alleged inva-
sions of individual privacy interests.1s The Committee uncovered the
alarming truth that the CIA spied illegally on as many as seven thou-
sand Americans through the 1960s and early 1970s in Operation
CHAOS, including individuals involved in the peace movement, stu-
dent activists, and black nationalists. 83 The Church Committee Re-
port84 revealed how the absence of clear statutory or judicial standards
led to widespread warrantless electronic surveillance of individuals
who were not associated in any way with a foreign power, did not seem
to pose a threat to national security, and were not suspected of being
involved in criminal activity.85 These findings compelled Congress to
create a statutory code to definitively determine the role of the Execu-
tive in authorizing intelligence surveillance of foreign powers and in-
dividuals engaged in activities deemed to threaten national security.
In 1978, FISA was enacted into law.86
2. FISA Deconstructed
FISA provides statutory authorization for electronic surveillance in
the limited context when surveillance is sought to target a foreign
82 Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793,
806-07 (1989) (noting the activities of the Church Committee in investigating intelli-
gence agencies and finding that "warrantless electronic surveillance had been used
against United States Citizens who were not readily identifiable as reasonable sources
of foreign intelligence information").
83 "Operation CHAOS involved an extensive program of information sharing from
the FBI and other agencies to the CIA. CIA received all of the FBI's reports on the
American peace movement, which numbered over [one thousand per month] by June
of 1970, according to [the] ... 'Church Committee Report."' ACLU, Surveillance of
Americans: How the Senate Anti-Terrorism Bill Puts the CIA Back in the Business of Spying on
Americans, at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l100901b.htinl (Oct. 9, 2001).
84 2 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVRTIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (2d Sess. 1976).
85 Cinquegrana, supra note 82, at 806-07.
86 Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 301, 92 Stat. 1783, 1798 (1978).
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power or an agent of a foreign power, s7 and when the purpose of the
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.8" By enact-
ing FISA, "Congress sought to accommodate and advance both the
government's interest in pursuing legitimate intelligence activity and
the individual's interest in freedom from improper government intru-
sion." 9 FISA broadly defines the term "foreign power" as a foreign
government, a faction of a foreign nation, a group engaged in inter-
national terrorism, an entity directed and controlled by a foreign gov-
ernment, or a foreign-based political organization not substantially
composed of United States persons.9° An "agent of a foreign power" is
defined as any non-United States person who: acts in the United
States as an officer, employee, or member of a foreign power; or acts
on behalf of a foreign power engaging in clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities in the United States.9 The definition of "agent of foreign
power" also includes any persons: who knowingly perform clandestine
87 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (4) (A) (1994). See generally United States v. Cavanagh, 807
F.2d 787, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1987) (outlining FISA's requirements for electronic surveil-
lance of foreign powers and their agents).
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (1994). The Act defines "foreign intelligence infor-
mation" as:
information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is neces-
sary to, the ability of the United States to protect against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (e)(1) (1994).
89 Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 789; see also ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C. Cir.
1991) ("By enacting FISA, Congress sought to resolve doubts about the constitutional-
ity of warrantless, foreign security surveillance and yet protect the interests of the
United States in obtaining vital intelligence about foreign powers."); United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Congress enacted FISA in 1978 'to es-
tablish procedures for the use of electronic surveillance in gathering foreign intelli-
gence information.'" (quoting In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1986)));
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1987) ("FISA was passed by Con-
gress in 1978 to create a 'secure framework by which the Executive Branch may con-
duct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the
context of this Nation's commitment to privacy and individual rights."' (quoting S.
REP. No. 95-604, at 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916)).
90 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (a) (1994); see also United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1462
(11th Cir. 1987) ("FISA contains several definitions of 'foreign power' and 'agent of a
foreign power' pertinent to this case. 'Foreign power' includes 'a group engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore."' (quoting 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (a) (4) (1994))).
91 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (1994).
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intelligence gathering activities on behalf of a foreign power, whose
activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States; who knowingly engage in sabotage or international
terrorism on behalf of a foreign power; who knowingly enter the
United States under a false identity for a foreign power; or who know-
ingly aid, abet, or conspire with any person in the conduct of the
92
above activities. Furthermore, "United States person" is defined as a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence:
Each application for surveillance authorization must be made by a
federal officer, with the approval of the Attorney General, to the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) .9  FISA mandates the
formation of this special court, which consists of seven district court
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, to hear all
FISA applications for electronic surveillance.95 A FISCjudge is permit-
ted to authorize a FISA surveillance if she finds, among other factors,
96
that
there is probable cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power: Provided,
That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment. 7
While it is integral to the surveillance authorization process that the
FISCjudge make this finding, the court in United States v. Duggan clari-
fied the role of the FISC by stating that once the Attorney General
certifies the application of a federal officer, the surveillance request is
"subjected to only minimal scrutiny by the courts."98
Proceedings of the FISC, including applications made and orders
92 Id. § 1801 (b) (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
93 Id. § 1801(i) (1994).
94 Id. § 1804(a); see also Barr, 952 F.2d at 461 ("Before an application seeking
authorization for surveillance may be filed with the FISA Court, the Attorney General
mustpersonally approve it.").
95 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1994); see also United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791
(9th Cir. 1987) ("The special FISA court is composed of seven United States District
Judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United States." (citing 50 U.S.C.
§ 1803(a) (1982))).
96 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(1)-(5) (1994).
97 Id. § 1805(a) (3) (A); see Barr, 952 F.2d at 461-62 (discussing the factors a FISA
judge must establish before she is authorized to enter an order approving surveillance
pursuant to § 1805); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987)
(same); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 789 (same).
98 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
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granted, are conducted and maintained in secrecy due to national se-
curity concerns regarding the information submitted to the court!0
Although such secrecy may be justified-as public knowledge of ap-
plications and granted surveillance authority likely would undermine
the success of the information gathering process-the secret nature of
these proceedings is troublesome, particularly to the targets who later
wish to determine the validity of a surveillance application or grant of
authority. In United States v. Badia, the target of FISA surveillance
sought disclosure of the FISA application to review it for errors or
falsehoods, as he believed that the surveillance was imposed not to
seek foreign intelligence information, but rather to conduct a crimi-
nal investigation.'00 The Eleventh Circuit denied the request, stating
that "where the Attorney General files an 'affidavit under oath, that
disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of
the United States,' § 1806(b) of FISA provides for in camera, ex parte
review of the application by the court."'0 ' Therefore, although the
highly confidential nature of investigating targets suspected of engag-
ing in activities that may undermine national security clearly warrants
greater precautions, this rationale is little consolation to innocent
parties who have limited means to discover the reason for a complete
violation of their privacy. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Mitchell v. Forsyth, "[n]ational security tasks ... are carried out in se-
cret; open conflict and overt winners and losers are rare. Under such
circumstances, it is far more likely that actual abuses will go uncovered
than that fancied abuses will give rise to unfounded and burdensome
litigation.",
0 3
Title III diverges from FISA in a very important respect, as it pro-
vides for the disclosure of Title III applications made and orders
granted upon a showing of good cause by the target. 10 4 Additionally,
Title III includes a notice requirement, providing that within a rea-
sonable time after either the denial of an application or the termina-
tion of surveillance, the issuing or denying judge will serve both the
target and third parties to intercepted communications notice of the
99 50 U.S.C. § 1803(c) (1994).
too 827 F.2d at 1462.
101 Id. at 1464 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) (1994)).
102 See generally Gregory E. Birkenstock, Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
and Standards of Probable Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 845 (1992)
("Even under FISA's regulatory scheme, the words 'national security' appear to have
acquired a near-talismanic significance for many courts.").
103 472 U.S. 511, 522 (1985).
104 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) (1994).
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application or order, information concerning the period of surveil-
lance, and whether or not communications were intercepted.1 0 5 This
protective measure allows the target of intercepted communications
an opportunity to bring suit if she believes that the authorized surveil-
lance violated her Fourth Amendment rights. FISA does not provide
a similar privacy protection to targets of a completed FISA surveil-
lance. This practically ensures that intrusive wiretaps that do not un-
cover incriminating information, and therefore do not result in
prosecutions, never will be made known to the target.
Each federal officer seeking surveillance authority must satisfy the
numerous application criteria explicitly laid out in § 1804 of FISA, in-
cluding but not limited to: the identity or a description of the target,
the facts or circumstances leading the applicant to believe that the
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, that each of
the sites of surveillance is being used or is about to be used by a for-
eign power or an agent of a foreign power, a statement of the pro-
posed minimization procedures, a detailed description of the nature
of the information sought, that a certifying official deems that the in-
formation sought is foreign intelligence information, that such infor-
mation cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques, and that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information.'06 Although these extensive requirements
suggest that the applying federal officer must have engaged in a thor-
ough investigation of the target to supply the court sufficient informa-
tion, none of the criteria necessary for application of FISA surveillance
court orders rise to the level of the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement. The federal officer does not need to demonstrate
that a criminal or unlawful act has been or is about to be committed
before she is granted authority to intrude upon the privacy interests of
the specified target. Theoretically, the officer is not seeking evi-
dence of criminal activities on which to base a prosecution, but rather
is seeking information regarding foreign intelligence activities that
may compromise national security.
105 Id. § 2518(8)(d) (1994).
106 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)-(b) (1994); see also ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 461 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (setting out the facts that an application to the FISC for a surveillance court
order must include); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1463 (lth Cir. 1987)
(same); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1987) (same).
107 If a given target is a United States person, the most a federal officer will need to
demonstrate to the FISC is that the target's activities "involve or may involve a violation
of the criminal statutes of the United States"-a low threshold of proof to obtain sur-
veillance authorization. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2) (A) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Despite the comprehensive requirements of § 1804, many liber-
tarians are concerned that in practice, a "FISA interception order re-
quires little beyond probable cause to believe that the person or
group targeted is an agent of a foreign power or an international ter-
rorist group."10 8 Additionally, upon reviewing the statistics regarding
grants of surveillance authority by the FISC, it becomes increasingly
clear that the court's actual standards may not be too exacting. For
example, "[a] ccording to the Center for Democracy and Technology,
the special court, which approved more than 1,000 surveillance re-
quests last year, has denied only one request in 22 years."'0 9
Beyond FISA's seemingly lenient warrant requirements, FISA fur-
ther empowers the Executive to authorize electronic surveillance as a
means to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to
one year. Authorization under FISA is appropriate where the Attor-
ney General certifies that the acquired communications are exclu-
sively between foreign powers or are made by individuals under the
exclusive control of a foreign power, and that there is no substantial
likelihood that the surveillance will acquire communication to which a
United States person is a party." ° Although the Attorney General
must transmit to the FISC a copy of his certification,"' this document
remains sealed unless an application for a court order is made, or the
certification is later necessary to determine the legality of the surveil-
lance. 1 2 Therefore, the FISC never reviews the Attorney General's ac-
tions unless an aggrieved party brings suit. This unfettered authority
of the Executive is problematic in that the Attorney General is not a
neutral party in matters of foreign intelligence," 3 and may not have
the same ability as an impartial judge to ensure that the requirements
of § 1802 are sufficiently met. Withoutjudicial oversight, the Attorney
General's surveillance powers remain largely unchecked, and abuses
could occur. As the Supreme Court explained in United States District
Court, "It]he independent check upon executive discretion is not sat-
108 Ronald L. Kuby, Ashcrofl Should Slow Down His Rush to Change Our Laws,
NEWSDAY (NewYork), Oct. 4, 2001, at A44.
109 Marcia Coyle, Sharp Debate on Surveillance Law: Pick Between Two Little Words
Makes a Big Difference, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, atA13.
110 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1) (1994).
III Id. § 1802(a) (3) (1994).
112 Id.
113 See supra text accompanying note 41 (providing Justice Douglas's opinion that
"[i]n matters where [the President or Attorney General] believe national security may
be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate
must be").
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isfied... by 'extremely limited' post-surveillance judicial review. In-
deed, post-surveillance review would never reach the surveillances that
failed to result in prosecutions. Prior review by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth
Amendment rights.""4
The Attorney General also may authorize warrantless surveillance
activities upon reasonably determining that an emergency situation
requires immediate acquisition of foreign intelligence information."'
Under these circumstances, the Attorney General must make an ap-
plication to a FISC judge within twenty-four hours after the surveil-
lance is authorized."" This raises yet another concern; namely, that in
practice the Attorney General may designate any situation an "emer-
gency," as the statute does not define what elements must be present
for a set of circumstances to be deemed as such. Although the Attor-
ney General must notify the court within a twenty-four hour period of
its activities, once the surveillance has commenced it is unlikely the
court will interfere.
3. FISA in Practice
The first courts to address this new statute unanimously held FISA
to be constitutional and sufficient in protecting the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the individuals subject to its authorized surveillance. In
Duggan, the FBI obtained a court order to conduct surveillance on
four individuals. 7 working on behalf of the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army to acquire weapons in the United States for export to
Northern Ireland for use in terrorist activities."" Here, the Second
Circuit found "the procedures fashioned in FISA [to be] a constitu-
tionally adequate balancing of the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights against the nation's need to obtain foreign intelligence infor-
mation.""' In United States v. Cavanagh, government officers inter-
cepted a telephone conversation of the appellant, an American citi-
zen, pursuant to FISA authorization, in which he offered to sell
114 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1972).
115 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(f) (West Supp. 2001).
Id.
117 The four defendants included an Irish national who sought political asylum in
the United States, an American citizen, and two aliens living illegally in the United
States. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1984).
118 See id. at 64-65 (upholding convictions based on electronic surveillance author-
ized under FISA).
119 Id. at 73.
THE USA PATRIOTA CT
defense secrets to representatives of the Soviet Union."2 The Ninth
Circuit made clear that "FISA satisfies the constraints the Fourth
Amendment places on foreign intelligence surveillance conducted by
the government."' 2' Additionally, upon reviewing a court-ordered
FISA surveillance of a former National Security Agency (NSA) em-
ployee suspected of selling classified information about NSA programs
to the Soviet Union, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Pelton af-
firmed the district court's finding that the primary purpose of the sur-
veillance was to gather foreign intelligence information.' The court
stated that "[w]e now join the other courts of appeal that have re-
viewed FISA and held that the statute meets constitutional require-
ments. FISA's numerous safeguards provide sufficient protection for
the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment within the context of
foreign intelligence activities.' '123 Additionally, in Badia, as discussed
above, while the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly make reference to
the constitutionality of FISA, the court clearly analyzed the surveil-
lance target's claims under FISA,124 thereby implicitly accepting the
statute as passing constitutional scrutiny.
Although the courts that have addressed FISA universally have
found the statutory provisions constitutional,125 a few pre-FISA courts
acknowledged the potential for abuse that could result from permit-
ting a foreign intelligence exception to the FISA warrant requirement.
In Chagnon v. Bell, the D.C. Circuit warned that "when the foreign
agent exception is invoked to justify warrantless surveillance, courts
must be alert to the possible pretextuality of the claim.'' 26 Therefore,
the court must determine whether there exists a "'direct link between
the wiretap target and a foreign interest as a justification for surveil-
120 See 807 F.2d 787, 788 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court's refusal to
suppress the "fruits" of the electronic surveillance).
121 See id. at 790 (citing Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74; In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002,
1010-14 (C.D. Cal. 1985), affd, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Megahey,
553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306,
1311-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
122 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The FISA evidence in this case was ob-
tained in accordance with the requirements of the statute, and was properly admitted
by the district court.").
123 Id. at 1075 (citing Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 792; Duggan, 743 F.2d at 76).
124 United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1462-65 (11th Cir. 1987).
125 See Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1075 ("We nowjoin the other courts of appeal that have
reviewed FISA and held that the statute meets constitutional requirements."); Cava-
nagh, 807 F.2d at 790 ("We find that the probable cause showing required by FISA is
reasonable.").
126 642 F.2d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16732002]
1674 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1651
lance' and... [whether] the surveillance was 'reasonably intended to
guard national security data from foreign intelligence agencies.
' '117
Moreover, in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, after approving the
warrantless FISA surveillance of a target suspected of passing classified
United States documents to the North Vietnamese government, the
Fourth Circuit cautioned,
[B] ecause individual privacy interests are severely compromised any time
the government conducts surveillance without prior judicial approval,
this foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement must be carefully limited to those situations in which the
interests of the executive are paramount. First, the government should
be relieved of seeking a warrant only when the object of ... the surveil-
lance is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators .... Second.... the
executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the sur-
veillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons.128
While both of these cases were decided applying pre-FISA law,12 their
cautionary statements remain appropriate in light of the warrantless
surveillance authority granted to the Executive through §§ 1802130 and
1805 (f) 131 of FISA.
III. SURVEILLANCE LAW UNDER THE USA PATRIOT ACT
A. "The Purpose" of Surveillance Becomes "A Signicant Purpose"-
Permitting Primarily Criminal Investigations to Fall
Within FISA Surveillance Authority
Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends FISA
§ 1804(a) (7) (B). Now, in an application to the FISC, a federal officer
no longer has to demonstrate that "the purpose of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information,"'3 but may obtain surveil-
lance authorization under the less stringent showing that "a signficant
purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion."133 This slight alteration in the language of § 1804 is highly sig-
127 Id. (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
128 629 F.2d 908,915 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
129 The courts used pre-FISA law because the wiretaps in question were authorized
before 1978, the year FISA was enacted.
10 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (West Supp. 2001) (permitting electronic surveillance
authorization without a court order).
131 See id. § 1805(f) (West Supp. 2001) (permitting warrantless electronic surveil-
lance authorization in emergency situations).
132 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (1994) (emphasis added).
133 H.R. Res. 3162, 107th Cong. § 218 (2001) (enacted) (emphasis added).
THE USA PATRIOT ACT
nificant in that it is extremely likely to increase the types of court-
ordered investigations that are carried out in the name of "foreign in-
telligence investigations" under FISA. Considering the fact that the
FISC has only turned down one surveillance application since its in-
134
ception, it becomes even more likely that the court will authorize all
forthcoming applications under this more lenient standard.
The concern raised by this amendment is that under the new
broadened scope of § 1804, both intelligence and law enforcement
agents will bring applications for electronic surveillance to the FISC
when the primary purpose of the surveillance is an investigation of
criminal activities. Thus, the amended FISA will be used as a means to
undertake surveillance without demonstrating the heightened stan-
dard of probable cause required under Title III for criminal wiretaps.
This potential end-run around the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause requirement for criminal investigations contradicts the rationale
for permitting a lower threshold for obtaining FISA wiretaps. No
longer will this lesser standard solely authorize investigations of pri-
marily foreign intelligence activities where the rights of Americans are
generally not implicated. Instead, FISA will be employed to approve
investigations of predominantly criminal activities, including purely
domestic criminal acts-in explicit violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 1 3 Now, under section 218 a criminal investigation can be the
primary purpose of a FISA investigation, with foreign intelligence in-
formation as a secondary, albeit "significant purpose."3 6 Senator
14 See Coyle, supra note 109, at A13 ("According to the Center for Democracy and
Technology, the special court, which approved more than 1,000 surveillance requests
last year, has denied only one request in 22 years.").
135 See 147 CONG. REc. S10,593 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Cant-
well) ("Where information is sought for the purpose of law enforcement, we must en-
sure that fourth amendment protections apply. Much of the fear about the legislation
is based on legitimate concern that information gathered ostensibly for intelligence
and defense purposes could be used for law enforcement purposes."). Senator Cant-
well went on to make a distinction between intelligence and law enforcement uses of
surveillance. She argued that "[t]he intelligence community does not prosecute and
lock up its targets; it uses information to intervene against foreign nationals seeking to
harm America." Id. In comparison, Cantwell argued that the "law enforcement com-
munity has a different mission, to catch and prosecute criminals in our courts of law.
Because law enforcement acts upon U.S. citizens, it must do so within the bounds of
the Constitution." Id.
136 H.R. Res. 3162, 107th Cong. § 218 (2001) (enacted); see 147 CONG. REc.
S10,593 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Cantwell) ("[T]he possibility re-
mains that the primary purpose of the wiretap would be a criminal investigation, with-
out the safeguards of the title III wiretap law and the protections under the fourth
amendment that those fulfill.").
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Leahy recognized that by amending the language of FISA, "the USA
Act:17 would make it easier for the FBI to use a FISA wiretap to obtain
information where the Government's most important motivation for
the wiretap is for use in a criminal prosecution., ,138 The Senator fur-
ther acknowledged that "[t]his is a disturbing and dangerous change
in the law.'
'131
Furthermore, as the USA PATRIOT Act's amendment to FISA
does not provide a definition of "significant purpose," it is unclear
how far the FISC will stretch its interpretation of this phrase to ac-
commodate law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their quest
to increase surveillance as a response to the September 11th terrorist
attacks. Yet, the consequences of this amendment to FISA go far be-
yond investigations of the September 11th tragedy. Now, surveillance
authority for investigations seeking information primarily pertaining
to purely domestic criminal activities may be granted under FISA with
no showing of probable cause that a serious crime has been or will
soon be committed.
Several courts have addressed the situation in which a surveillance
target contends that the actual purpose of the surveillance was crimi-
nal investigation as opposed to the government's purported rationale
of foreign intelligence gathering. Pre-FISA, circuit courts addressing
this issue made clear that they would only uphold executive authoriza-
tion through post-surveillance judicial review when conducted for the
"primary purpose" of gathering foreign intelligence information. 140
Although these cases involve situations where the Executive engaged
in warrantless surveillance, the accounts of these courts apply equally
to a discussion concerning the standard for court-ordered surveillance
under FISA. In Butenko, the Third Circuit expressly admonished that
"[s] ince the primary purpose of these searches is to secure foreign in-
telligence information, a judge, when reviewing a particular search
must, above all, be assured that this was in fact its primary purpose
and that the accumulation of evidence of criminal activity was inciden-
tal."'" The Fifth Circuit also made clear its position on the use of
FISA-authorized surveillance for the purpose of engaging in criminal
investigations in Brown, by asserting "[t]here is no indication that de-
117 At the time of this statement, the Senate was discussing the Senate's precursor
to the USA PATRIOT Act, yet the provision is identical to the one enacted into law.
138 147 CONG. REC. S10,593 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
139 Id.
140 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
41 United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606 (3d Cir. 1974).
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fendant's telephone conversations were monitored for the purpose of
gaining information to use at his trial, a practice we would immedi-
ately proscribe with appropriate remedy. 1 42 The Fourth Circuit in
Truong similarly found:
[T]he executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when
the surveillance is conducted "primarily" for foreign intelligence rea-
sons .... [O]nce surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investiga-
tion, the courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy interests
come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede when
the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal
prosecution. We thus reject the government's assertion that, if surveil-
lance is to any degree directed at gathering foreign intelligence, the ex-
ecutive may ignore the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
143
ment.
These statements plainly reveal these courts' belief that anything less
than an indication that the primary purpose of a given surveillance is
to gather foreign intelligence information would be unacceptable.
Furthermore, post-FISA, the Second Circuit in Duggan stated that
"[t]he requirement that foreign intelligence information be the pri-
mary objective of the surveillance is plain.' 44 In Cavanagh, the Ninth
Circuit explained that "the purpose of... [foreign intelligence] sur-
veillance is not to ferret out criminal activity but rather to gather intel-
ligence." 45 The Ninth Circuit further held in United States v. Sarkissian
that "[w]e have generally stated that the purpose of the surveillance
must be to secure foreign intelligence information." 146 And in Pelton,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to approve of
the surveillance activity in question because the "primary purpose of
the surveillance, both initially and throughout, was to gather foreign
intelligence information." 47
In a discussion of this provision during development of the USA
PATRIOT Act, Senator Leahy admitted that "even the [Justice] De-
partment concedes that the court's [sic] may impose a constitutional
requirement of 'primary purpose' based on the appellate court deci-
sions upholding FISA against constitutional challenges over the past
142 United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 1973).
143 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980).
144 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
145 United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1987).
146 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
147 United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
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20 years." 148 The Senator's statement reveals the Senate's recognition
and dismissal of the above circuit courts' collective conclusion regard-
ing foreign intelligence investigations-only electronic surveillance
primarily directed at gathering foreign intelligence information will
be acceptable to the courts. Instead of granting due deference to the
carefully considered findings of these federal courts of appeals, Con-
gress and the Bush administration ignored clear judicial signals and
created a provision that flies in the face of more than twenty years of
sound case law.
Furthermore, although a number of the circuit courts have sup-
ported the finding that a FISA surveillance is not undermined simply
because the agents gathered evidence that later may have proved use-
ful as evidence in a criminal trial,'" this conclusion is different from
saying that the government may engage in surveillance for the pri-
mary purpose of obtaining evidence on which to base a criminal
prosecution. The distinction is clear where an agent engages in FISA
surveillance to gather intelligence information and, as a result of this
authorized activity, intercepts incriminating statements that are
thereupon used to support a criminal charge. This sequence of events
generally has been accepted as a valid and legal corollary of a FISA
surveillance. 50 Yet the courts have in no way approved of a situation
where an agent conducts a FISA surveillance for the purpose of gather-
ing information regarding a target's criminal activities-with an un-
derlying secondary purpose of collecting intelligence information-
and subsequently uses the intercepted statements as the foundation
for bringing criminal charges against the target. By relaxing this provi-
sion of FISA concerning what an applicant for foreign intelligence
148 147 CONG. REC. S10,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
149 See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 ("[0] therwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted
simply because the government can anticipate that the fruits of the surveillance may
later be used, as allowed by § 1806(b), as evidence in a criminal trial."); see also Pelton,
835 F.2d at 1076 (quoting Duggan); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th
Cir. 1987) ("We point out that an otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted be-
cause the government may later use the information obtained as evidence in a criminal
trial."); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 791 ("[T]here is no merit to the contention that [the
target of surveillance] is entitled to suppression simply because evidence of his crimi-
nal conduct was discovered incidentally as the result of an intelligence surveillance not
supported by probable cause of criminal activity."); cf 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(b) (West
Supp. 2001) ("No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter shall be disclosed
for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement
that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a
criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General.").
150 See supra note 149 (listing cases that demonstrate courts' allowance of evidence
of criminal wrongdoing obtained incidentally to a FISA surveillance).
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surveillance authority must demonstrate to the FISC,"' it is conceiv-
able that authorizations for surveillance power will be granted for the
purpose of investigating primarily domestic criminal activity that has
some insignificant foreign flavor, pursuant to FISA. Senator Leahy
recognized that amending FISA in this way would allow for the exten-
sion of FISA-authorized surveillance for primarily criminal investiga-
tions when he indicated before the Senate: "it will be up to the courts
to determine how far law enforcement agencies may use FISA for
criminal investigation and prosecution beyond the scope of the statu-
tory definition of 'foreign intelligence information."1 2 This acknow-
ledgement is relevant in that it makes clear that the Senate foresaw
the use of FISA surveillance by law enforcement agents in conducting
criminal investigations-permitting an end-run around the probable
cause requirement of Title III-thereby violating the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of all targets subject to such surveillance.
It may be useful to consider the following example to understand
better the infringement of Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
the Senate recognized in this amendment to FISA and seemed con-
tent to allow. If a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent is an active protes-
tor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an organization whose
members and protestors often resort to acts of violence against mer-
chants and politicians who support the WTO, a law enforcement
agent now may seek surveillance of this individual under FISA, rather
than through a Title III application. Here, the agent likely would
claim a significant foreign intelligence purpose, such as investigating
the individual's ties to a Pakistani group affiliated with the Taliban,
while the true focus of the investigation and clear primary purpose
would be a purely domestic criminal investigation of the individual's
activities as a member of the anti-WTO group. This strategic use of
FISA for primarily criminal investigations contravenes the statements
of those courts of appeals that have addressed intelligence surveil-
lance.153 According to those courts, once the principal purpose of a
FISA surveillance becomes a criminal investigation, a judge of compe-
tent jurisdiction must find probable cause that a serious crime has
been or will be committed before surveillance may continue, as re-
quired by Title III and the Fourth Amendment.
In remarks made before the Senate, Senator Feinstein argued that
151 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (1994).
152 147 CONG. REc. S10,558 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
153 See supra notes 61-70, 140-47 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
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amending the language of § 1804(a) (7) (B) would be advantageous, as
"[t]he effect of this provision [would] be to make it easier for law en-
forcement to obtain a FISA search or surveillance warrant for those
cases where the subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of
valuable intelligence and the potential target of a criminal prosecu-
tion.' 54 Although indeed there likely will be many cases where surveil-
lance of a particular target is necessary for both criminal investigation
and foreign intelligence purposes, making it easier for agents to ob-
tain FISA authority for this type of surveillance does not outweigh the
likelihood of abuses that will result from lessening the standard for re-
ceiving a FISA surveillance order. An approach that is more protec-
tive of a target's constitutional rights would require agents to obtain
surveillance authority under the more stringent requirements of Title
III where an investigation appears to have equal elements of a crimi-
nal investigative and a foreign intelligence gathering purpose.
Different legal standards apply to investigations for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information versus those for the pur-
pose of obtaining criminal evidence. Allowing this new language of a
"significant purpose" to blur that distinction is inherently problematic
in that it will allow courts to apply the lesser standard of FISA surveil-
lance to criminal investigations, without establishing pre-surveillance
probable cause. When the overriding purpose of a surveillance re-
quest is unclear, preserving the privacy interests of a potentially inno-
cent target should be a higher priority than facilitating the receipt of
surveillance authority, especially considering the intrusive nature of
such surveillance. It is worth noting that in analyzing these provisions
one must think not only about how the USA PATRIOT Act will affect
terrorists, but also how the language of the USA PATRIOT Act will
apply to all Americans who find themselves under the invasive gaze of
a governmental surveillance order.
B. Allowing Primarily Criminal Investigations to Fall Within FISA
Surveillance Authority Minimizes Judicial Oversight
of the Criminal Investigative Process
An additional concern arises as a consequence of amending the
language of § 1804(a) (7) (B) from "purpose" to "significant purpose":
if law enforcement agents take advantage of the option to bring appli-
cations for surveillance authority directed at investigations of primar-
ily criminal activities to the FISC, this will greatly minimize judicial
154 147 CONG. REc. S10,591 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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oversight of criminal investigations. As discussed earlier, Title III re-
quires the applicant for surveillance authority to demonstrate a find-
ing of probable cause that a crime has been or will soon be commit-
ted.' 55 This high threshold of proof as a condition precedent to the
judge's grant of a warrant ensures that the surveillance applicant has
engaged in an adequate investigation and has attained the requisite
information to justify infringing the target's privacy interests. While
FISA also requires a FISC judge to find certain factors set out in 50
U.S.C. § 1805, the Second Circuit in Duggan made clear that the role
of the judge in reviewing FISA applications is minimal: "The FISA
Judge, in reviewing the application, is not to second-guess the execu-
tive branch official's certification that the objective of the surveillance
is foreign intelligence information .... Thus, the representations and
certifications submitted in support of an application for FISA surveil-
lance should be presumed valid."' 6 Therefore, it is clear that if law
enforcement agents are given the opportunity to apply for surveil-
lance authority intended for a primarily criminal investigation under
the expanded "significant purpose" language of section 218, there will
be less stringent review of the surveillance application during the ini-
tial grant of authority.
A FISC grant of authority for surveillance of criminal activities has
implications beyond the initial "minimal scrutiny,"" '7 as surveillance
extensions under FISA serve to reduce further judicial oversight that
would be provided by a Title III authorization. Under Title III, all
grants of wiretap authority may continue no longer than thirty days.
15
1
If after the thirty-day limit the law enforcement agent conducting a
given wiretap would like to prolong surveillance, he may do so only
upon application for an extension.' 59 This relatively short period of
time allotted for surveillance of criminal suspects ensures that a neu-
tral and detached judge will be involved sufficiently with reviewing
whether the surveillance has been performed to the satisfaction of the
court, as well as whether the information obtained thus far justifies
155 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a) (1994).
156 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1984).
157 Id.
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994) ("No order entered under this section may
authorize or approve the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication
for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization,
nor in any event longer than thirty days.").
159 See id. ("Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for
an extension made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and the court
making the findings required by subsection (3) of this section.").
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continuation of surveillance. If the court believes the circumstances
warrant an extension, Title III provides that "[t]he period of exten-
sion shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to
achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event for
longer than thirty days.' '60 In contrast, FISA allows the initial surveil-
lance to continue for up to ninety days, or one year for surveillance
targeted against a foreign power,16 thereby providing far less judicial
supervision of surveillance activities. Therefore, if a law enforcement
agent will be permitted to receive FISA surveillance authority for a
predominantly criminal investigation under the "significant purpose"
amendment to § 1804(a) (7) (B), judicial oversight of the authorized
surveillance will be greatly reduced. The resulting effect will allow
criminal investigations to continue from three to twelve times
longer, 16 before the law permits a neutral judge to review the actions
of the agents conducting the surveillance.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the reviewing court will be
granted the opportunity to evaluate the authorized surveillance upon
an agent's application for a surveillance extension. Because of the
short duration of Title III wiretaps, it is more likely that an agent will
have to apply for an extension-thereby allowing for judicial review-
than with the longer duration of a FISA surveillance. With a FISC
authorization of surveillance, agents may intercept all conversations of
a given criminal suspect for up to three months, and if at the end of
this time the agents decide not to apply for an extension, a judge will
never review the actions of the agents during this extended period of
time. Because FISA does not provide for notice of completed surveil-
lance to be given to targets, a target of such surveillance may never
know that his conversations had been intercepted and his privacy so
completely invaded.
Amending the language of § 1804(a) (7) (B) such that a FISA sur-
veillance now may be conducted as long as "a significant purpose of
the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information," disrupts
FISA's balance between allowing governmental actors the ability to
conduct surveillance as a means to safeguard national security, and
protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizens to be free
160 Id.
161 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(1) (West Supp. 2001); see also ACLU v. Barr, 952 F.2d
457, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing the duration of court-ordered surveillance under
FISA).
162 See Barr, 952 F.2d at 462 (applying the extended surveillance periods author-
ized by FISA).
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from unreasonable searches and seizures. By changing this one word
from "primary" to "significant," the USA PATRIOT Act permits the
government to intrude upon the privacy of Americans without dem-
onstrating probable cause that a crime has been or is soon to be
committed-and without sufficient judicial oversight of such invasive
governmental action.
C. Roving Wiretap Authority Is Expanded to FISA
Without Sufficient Privacy Protections
In 1986, Congress amended Title III to allow for 'roving wiretaps"
in criminal investigations.r" Therefore, if law enforcement agents
could demonstrate to the reviewing judge that a suspect purposely was
changing telephones as a means to thwart previously authorized gov-
ernmental wiretaps, they could obtain a "roving" wiretap warrant-al-
lowing agents the ability to target their surveillance on an individual,
rather than a particular telephone. 6 4 Congress further relaxed this
highly intrusive provision in 1998, by allowing roving wiretaps to be
approved when the target's conduct in changing telephones has the
effect of thwarting the electronic surveillance activities. 65 Although this
amendment loosened the standard for receiving a roving wiretap,
Congress included a provision requiring that law enforcement deter-
mine whether the target actually was using the phone line or was "rea-
sonably proximate to the instrument through which such communica-
tion will be or was transmitted"166 before wiretapping could begin-as
a means of protecting an innocent conversant from unnecessary inva-
sion of privacy. In practice, a Title III roving wiretap allows law en-
forcement agents to tap any telephone that the target has used or very
likely will use, but only intercept those conversations when the agents
reasonably believe the target is using a particular phone. Therefore, if
the target of a roving wiretap uses a telephone in a coffee shop, an-
other person's home, or an office, agents can tap that telephone for
the duration of time that the warrant specifies, up to the thirty-day
limit, subject to the "reasonably proximate" restraint. The Supreme
Court has not addressed whether roving wiretaps violate the Fourth
Amendment.
163 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (1994).
1 See ACLU, How the USA-PATRIOT Act Limits Judicial Oversight of Telephone and
Internet Surveillance (Oct. 23, 2001) (describing the 1986 amendments to Title III allow-
ing roving wiretaps), available at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l102301g.html.
165 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (Supp. IV 1998).
168 Id. § 2518(11) (b) (iv) (Supp. IV 1998).
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Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act serves to extend Tide III's
roving wiretap authority to intelligence wiretaps authorized under
FISA.' 6' Accordingly, if the behavior of a target has the effect of
thwarting a given wiretap, the FISC may grant roving wiretap authority
to the agent seeking surveillance. Advances in technology clearly jus-
tify modifying FISA to allow intelligence surveillance to meet the
growing use of cellular telephones, pagers, and e-mail, all portable
methods of communication that may have the effect of thwarting sur-
168veillance, so that "surveillance can continue without disruption
when, for example, a suspect changes cell phone numbers."
69
Yet, the extension of roving wiretap authority to FISA raises ques-
tions regarding how this provision will be implemented, as it does not
contain the "reasonably proximate" privacy protection provision of Ti-
tle III. Therefore, pursuant to FISA authority, an agent now may wire-
tap a telephone even if it is unclear whether the target is actually using
the telephone, or is reasonably close to it.170 An agent can wiretap and
listen to a phone line in an innocent individual's home for the entire
day, if the agent had information that the target was expected to visit
that person at some point during a given twenty-four hour period.
Even if it is clear that the target already had left the location, surveil-
lance of that telephone theoretically can continue for an unlimited
period of time. This means that the private conversations of the indi-
viduals who live in this particular home, as well as the conversations of
all the people they speak with on the telephone over the course of
that day, will be intercepted by the government without sufficientjus-• ,. • 171
tification. If section 206 contained a protection similar to the "rea-
167 See H.R. Res. 3162, 107th Cong. § 206 (2001) (detailing these amendments to
FISA).
168 "This authority is critical for tracking suspected spies and terrorists who are ex-
perts in counter-surveillance methods such as frequently changing locations and
communications devices such as phones and computer accounts." 147 CONG. REC.
S10,577 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch).169
James Heaney, New Anti-Terrorism Measure Inspires Passion on Both Sides; The White
House Is Pushing New Legislation to Protect the Nation From Today's Sophisticated Terrorists.
But Critics Suggest the Proposal Would Erode the Privacy Rights of Average Citizens, BUFFALO
NEws, Oct. 3, 2001, at Al.
170 Representative Scott explained that the roving wiretap provision
means that wherever the [target] goes, whatever phone that the [target] uses,
you can tap that phone, neighbors, pay phones, anybody else; and therefore
you have a situation where innocent people who may also be using that phone
will have their conversations listened in on. I will note that this is not limited
to terrorism, and it is not even limited to criminal activity.
147 CONG. REC. H6,760 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Scott).
17, In a discussion before the Senate, Senator Feingold gave the example that as
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sonably proximate" provision as Title III affords, the government
would not be able to listen to every conversation held on this phone
line throughout the day, but rather only those taking place when the
target is actually in that person's home. Considering the number of
telephones or modes of communication a given target could use dur-
ing the course of a ninety-day surveillance, it becomes clear just how
many private conversations could be listened to for "intelligence"
purposes.
Congress clearly recognized that section 206 will allow the gov-
ernment to infringe upon the privacy interests of innumerable Ameri-
cans, as Senator Feingold brought this issue to the Senate's attention
when he requested adding a provision similar to the protection af-S172
forded by the Title III "reasonably proximate" requirement. Sena-
tor Feingold proposed amending section 206 by including:
except that, in such circumstances, the order shall direct that the surveil-
lance shall be conducted only when the target's presence at the place
where, or use of the facility at which, the electronic surveillance is to be
directed has been ascertained by the person implementing the order
and that the electronic surveillance must be directed only at the com-
munication of the target.173
The Senator from Wisconsin explained:
I am not opposed to expanding existing roving wiretap authority to in-
clude FISA investigations, but I am very concerned that Section 206 does
not include a key safeguard that was part of the roving wiretap authority
when it was added to title III in 1986. That protection minimizes the
possible misuse of the authority, whether intentional or unintentional, to
eavesdrop on the conversations of individuals who are not the subject of
the investigation .... It seems to me that Congress struck the right bal-
section 206 currently stands, "[i]f the government receives information that the target
of the FISA investigation is making phone calls from a particular bank of pay phones in
a train station, it may set up wiretaps at all the phones in that bank... [such that] the
private conversations of innumerable innocent Americans... would be subject to gov-
ernment scrutiny." Id. at S10,576 (statement of Sen. Feingold). Feingold continued,
"That violates their Fourth Amendment rights. Similarly, the Government should not
be able to conduct surveillance on all payphones in a neighborhood frequented by a
suspected terrorist or on a particular payphone all day long while innocent people use
it." Id.
1 Id. Representative Scott also requested a similar amendment to section 206
that was not accepted by the House of Representatives, which "would have required
the police, when they are listening in on ... conversations, to stop listening when the
target is not using the phone. When the target leaves the organization or leaves the
building, stop listening." 147 CONG. REC. H7,159 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (statement
of Rep. Scott).
147 CONG. REc. S10,575 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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ance in that provision. It recognized the needs of law enforcement, but
also recognized that rights of innocent people were implicated and de-
signed a safeguard to protect them.
174
Senator Feingold further explained that a protective provision similar
to that found under Title III likely would not hinder intelligence or
law enforcement surveillance activities under FISA, as the longstand-
ing success of extensive and sophisticated Title III wiretaps demon-
strates.175 If the "reasonably proximate" provision of Title III wiretaps
had been found to be inefficient and burdensome there would have
been an effort to change it, yet there has been no such endeavor since
the enactment of the provision in 1986.176 Therefore, there is no le-
gitimate reason why Senator Feingold's proposed amendment or a
provision similar to that found in Title III should not be added to sec-
tion 206's extension of roving wiretap authority to FISA surveillance.
Senator Hatch addressed Senator Feingold's remarks by stating
that a provision similar to Title III's "reasonably proximate" require-
ment "is operationally unWorkable. The way that roving orders are
implemented, requires that law enforcement officers have the ability
to spot check several different telephones in order to determine
which one is being used by the target of the order."1 77 Unfortunately,
Senator Hatch's rationale for not supporting Senator Feingold's pro-
posal seems to stem from a skewed understanding of the Wisconsin
Senator's proposed amendment to section 206. Senator Feingold's
suggestion would allow agents conducting a FISA surveillance to spot
check any telephones that the target may be using, but only as long as
the agent has some indication that the target is in the location where
the wiretap is located and the agent reasonably believes the target is
using that particular phone. Therefore, if the target visits an office,
the agents conducting surveillance could intercept any conversations
coming from that office while the target is present there. The agent,
however, would have to cease all surveillance activities once the target
had left the building, or if it is clear that the target was no longer us-
ing any phone lines. As Senator Leahy further explained, "Senator
Feingold's amendment simply assures that when roving surveillance is
conducted, the Government makes efforts to ascertain that the target
is actually at the place or using the phone, being tapped. This is re-
quired in the criminal context. It is unfortunate that the Administra-
174 Id. at S10,575-76.
175 Id. at S10,575.
176 Id. at S10,577.
177 Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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tion did not accept this amendment.
17
1
The most distressing aspect concerning the discussion of Senator
Feingold's proposed amendment to section 206 was the manner in
which it was hastily disregarded as a means to expedite the legislative
process. Instead of allotting sufficient time to consider a provision
that would safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of countless
Americans, the Senate tabled Senator Feingold's amendment in a de-
liberate attempt to create legislation, regardless of whether it would
pass constitutional scrutiny. This point was made all too clear by Sen-
ate Majority Leader Daschle when he stated in response to Senator
Feingold's proposal:
I am sympathetic to many of these ideas, but I am much more sympa-
thetic to arriving at a product that will bring us to a point where we can
pass something into law .... It is too late to open up the amendment
process in a way that might destroy that delicate balance [we have
achieved] 179
Furthermore, since FISA will be expanded under section 218 of
the USA PATRIOT Act-such that a greater number of law enforce-
ment agents will be likely to seek surveillance authority under the ra-
tionale that foreign intelligence gathering constitutes a "significant
purpose" of the investigation-section 206 of the Act now makes re-
ceiving surveillance authority for criminal investigations under FISA
even more attractive. Because the roving wiretap provision under
FISA does not require that the wiretapping agent ascertain whether
the target is actually using a particular telephone, a law enforcement
agent can tap a telephone for lengthy periods of time in the hope of
recording incriminating information from another source using that
line. The potential abuses of this provision are easily foreseeable in a
situation where a surveillance target lives, works, or spends time with a
third party who is also suspected of involvement in criminal behavior
and who uses the same telephones as the target. Under these circum-
stances, FISA grants the agents sufficient leeway to extend surveillance
to the third party, simply by listening to the telephones that the agents
believe the target and third party use. Here, individuals for whom
there is insufficient information to obtain FISA authority for surveil-
lance and inadequate information to establish probable cause as re-
quired under Title III, will be ensnared by FISA surveillance of an-
other target, thereby greatly expanding the reaches of a FISA wiretap
178 Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy).
179 Id. (statement of Sen. Daschle).
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authorization.
Although extending roving wiretap authority to FISA surveillance
is clearly a necessary legislative action considering the technological
advances in communications and the need for surveillance to match
such developments, the USA PATRIOT Act's amendment to FISA is
problematic in that it is not sufficiently tailored to protect the privacy
interests of third parties whose conversations undoubtedly will be in-
tercepted as a consequence of such poorly defined wiretap authority
under section 206. Without the protection afforded by the "reasona-
bly proximate" provision of Title III, or a similar provision such as that
proposed by Senator Feingold, section 206 will allow FISA surveillance
of a particular telephone line to extend for potentially unlimited and
unreasonable periods of time. The result of these extended wiretaps
will be the 'interception of nontargets' conversations, thereby unduly
violating these individuals' Fourth Amendment rights against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Despite the invasive nature of this sur-
veillance activity, it is unlikely that these third parties ever could dis-
cover that the government had so fully infringed their Fourth
Amendment rights. Unless the government brings charges against
such parties, the unsuspecting victims never will learn of the surveil-
lance activities.
D. New Definition of Domestic Terrorism Will Now Describe the
Activities of Many Politically Involved Americans
Section 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 2331,
which defines international terrorism by instituting a new crime of
"domestic terrorism." The Act broadly defines "domestic terrorism" as
activities that-
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.
Upon review of this expansive definition it becomes clear that many
180 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (5) (West Supp. 2001).
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acts of political dissent and activism now will be characterized as "do-
mestic terrorism." Such a broad definition for a wide range of under-
lying crimes greatly increases the number of activities that likely will
fall within the USA PATRIOT Act's scope. As the definition of "do-
mestic terrorism" stands, it encompasses activities ranging from those
of anti-abortion activists who use violence against women entering
Planned Parenthood clinics, to World Trade Organization protesters
who throw rocks through the windows of merchants and politicians
who publicly support the WTO. As Representative Paul clarified:
Under this broad definition, should a scuffle occur at an otherwise
peaceful pro-life demonstration the sponsoring organization may be-
come the target of a federal investigation for terrorism. We have seen
abuses of law enforcement authority in the past to harass individuals or
organizations with unpopular political views. I hope my colleagues con-
sider that they may be handing a future administration tools to investi-
gate pro-life or gun rights organizations on the grounds that fringe
members of their movements advocate violence. It is an unfortunate re-
ality that almost every political movement today, from gun rights to envi-
ronmentalism, has a violent fringe.1M'
By creating a new crime of "domestic terrorism" and including it
in an extensive anti-terrorism act, this action makes clear Congress's
and the administration's intent to use the full power of the govern-
ment's surveillance capability to combat both foreign and domestic
forms of terrorism. Although this is undoubtedly a necessary and im-
portant initiative, particularly in light of the events of September 11 th,
the language of section 802 has not been pursued in enough detail to
protect against using this broad definition as a means to silence or
prosecute political protestors and dissidents. As Representative Ku-
cinich stated before the House, "It is an attack on freedom to create
laws which can endanger legitimate protests."182 Here, it is important
to revisit the findings of the Church Committee, which uncovered ex-
tensive abuses of "foreign intelligence investigations" that were
authorized under the pretext of protecting national 
security. 183
The Church Committee found that the FBI's internal security and do-
mestic intelligence programs [as well as other national intelligence
agencies such as the CIA and NSA] compiled massive files on activities
protected by the First Amendment and the political opinions of Ameri-
cans .... The scope of intelligence gathering swept up environmental
181 147 CONG. REc. H6,768 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Paul).
182 Id. at H6,767 (statement of Rep. Kucinich).
183 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Church Commit-
tee's investigation of domestic intelligence agencies).
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groups, women's liberation activists, and virtually any organization that
mounted peaceful protest demonstrations.1
84
It is imperative that our laws prevent law enforcement and intelli-
gence agents from conducting surveillance of an individual or organi-
zation based primarily on an individual's First Amendment right to
exercise his or her freedom of speech and to associate with political
organizations of his or her choosing.
Considering how sections 218 and 206 ease the receipt of and ex-
tension-both in length of time and to third parties-of a FISA
authorized surveillance, it is likely that intelligence and law enforce-
ment agents will seek FISA authority to conduct investigations of "do-
mestic terrorism." Therefore, if a law enforcement or intelligence
agent can demonstrate to the FISC or the Attorney General that there
is some foreign connection to a particular activist group, such as re-
ceipt of money from an unknown foreign supporter or membership
of a foreign alien, this may be sufficient for a grant of surveillance
authority under FISA. Consider again the example mentioned earlier
of a U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent who is an active protestor of the
WTO. A law enforcement or intelligence agent may seek surveillance
authorization by claiming a significant foreign intelligence purpose,
such as investigating the individual's ties to a Pakistani group affiliated
with the Taliban. The true focus and primary purpose of the investi-
gation, however, would be a purely domestic criminal investigation of
the individual's activities as a member of the anti-WTO group.
Although FISA explicitly provides in § 1805(a) (3) (A) that "no
United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment," 18 5 the fact that a target is a member of a vocal po-
litical organization likely will play some role in establishing the basis for
a court-ordered surveillance authorization. As long as the agent ap-
plying for surveillance authority can demonstrate some other justifica-
tion beyond the target's involvement with the organization-such as
being born abroad, being married to a noncitizen, or traveling to
countries with which the United States does not have strong foreign
relations-this may be enough to receive a grant of surveillance from
the FISC. This conclusion is consistent with § 1805(b), which states
that "[i]n determining whether or not probable cause exists for pur-
poses of an order under subsection (a) (3), a judge may consider past
184 147 CONG. REc. S10,992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Rep. Leahy).
185 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (3) (A) (West Supp. 2001).
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activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances relating to




Furthermore, aside from court-ordered wiretaps, FISA also em-
powers the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order."" Under this significant grant of authority,
there is no provision prohibiting the Attorney General from granting
a surveillance order based primarily on an individual's membership in
a political organization. While the Attorney General must certify that
"there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a
party,' 88 the fact that there is no judicial review of the Attorney Gen-
eral's authorization creates "the temptation to utilize such surveil-
lances to oversee political dissent."189 Although the Supreme Court
definitively held in United States District Court that judicial approval
must be received before conducting surveillance on a domestic or-
ganization,90 the Attorney General authorized surveillance of the JDL
in Zweibon, not because the government feared for the national secu-
rity, but because they were concerned thatJDL activities "could create
a situation of international embarrassment to this country."'s' Zweibon
illustrates the government's penchant for abusing foreign intelligence
surveillance power. Any such abuse could have significant conse-
quences for domestic political organizations, considering that so many
are international in scope and that countless law-abiding Americans
are politically involved with various causes.
A foreseeable and troublesome consequence of extending FISA
surveillance to political protesters and activists is the infringement of
Americans' constitutional right to exercise their freedom of speech-
particularly when voices are raised for the purpose of political protest.
In United States District Court, the Court foresaw the potential for abuse
in situations where agents would use FISA surveillance authority to
186 Id. § 1805(b) (West Supp. 2001).
187 See id. § 1802 (West Supp. 2001) (specifying that electronic surveillance may be
authorized in order to acquire foreign intelligence information if certain conditions
are satisfied).
188 Id. § 1802(a) (1) (B).
189 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
190 Id. at 323-24.
191 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 609 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court dis-
cussed the Attorney General's motivation for authorizing surveillance and the lack of
evidence that the surveillance achieved its purported aim of providing advance knowl-
edge ofJDL activities causing international embarrassment to the United States. Id. at
609.
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target individuals involved with domestic political organizations:
National security cases .. .often reflect a convergence of First and
Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of "ordinary" crime.
Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such
cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected
speech .... Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary
when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unor-
thodoxy in their political beliefs .... The price of lawful public dissent
must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power.
Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous
citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversa-
tion. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential
to our free society.
Under federal law there are already three definitions of terror-'
ism-international terrorism,19 3 terrorism transcending national bor-194 195
ders,"" and federal terrorism 1-which together sufficiently character-
ize the various manifestations of terrorism, including the activities
perpetrated againstAmericans on September 11th. Therefore, it re-
mains unclear why this fourth broad definition is necessary, especially
given that it will serve to encompass the actions of political protestors.
While political protest and dissent is protected under the First
Amendment'96 as one of America's most cherished freedoms, the be-
havior is no longer shielded when protest becomes dangerous to hu-
man life.' 7 Individuals who participate in protests that become vio-
lent are criminally liable and subject to either fines or serious
penalties for their actions. These protests, however, are not necessar-
ily acts of "terrorism" and therefore should not be termed as such.
While violent acts of protest should not be condoned, the actions of a
protestor who throws a rock through a Congresswoman's office win-
dow to demonstrate disapproval of the WTO's political agenda should
not be equated with the horrific acts of terrorism that were perpe-
trated against the American people on September 11 th.
192 407 U.S. at 313-14.
193 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1994).
194 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (Supp. V 1999).
195 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g) (5) (West Supp. 2001).
196 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 33, at 86 ("Membership in, and activities in
support of, an organization that advocates even the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States are protected by the First Amendment, absent a showing
that the person specifically intends to further the organization's unlawful objectives.").
197 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' unwilling-
ness to protect violent or illegal acts under the guise of freedom of expression).
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CONCLUSION
After gaining a better understanding of the intrusions that sec-
tions 218, 206, and 802 of the USA PATRIOT Act will permit upon
constitutionally protected civil liberties, particularly our Fourth
Amendment right as American citizens "to be secure in [our] persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures''98 and our First Amendment right of "freedom of speech ...
[and] the right of the people peaceably to assemble,"'99 it is clear that
Americans should not be so willing to give up these valued freedoms
as a means to combat terrorism. Considering the strengths of pre-
USA PATRIOT Act laws, such as Title III and FISA, it is evident that
these finely balanced surveillance statutes provide the government
with sufficient means to investigate criminal activities and gather intel-
ligence information necessary to safeguard national security-without
unduly intruding upon the individual privacy interests of the Ameri-
can people. While the attacks of September l1th demonstrated a
need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of surveillance meas-
ures, there is no indication that current surveillance capabilities can-
not simply be increased or enhanced without radically altering the
confines of the existing authorizing laws to address terrorist threats.
Instead of determining whether Title III and FISA, as they existed
prior to enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, were adequate surveil-
lance authorities to combat the new terrorist activities, the administra-
tion strategically played upon the backdrop of September 11 th to pass
these new provisions that will provide the government with surveil-
lance authority that far surpasses its needs.' °°
In supporting the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Senator
Hatch stated, "the fact is that the bulk of these proposals have been
requested by the Department ofJustice for years, and have languished
in Congress for years because we have been unable to muster the col-
lective political will to enact them into law."2 0 ' Yet, perhaps these pro-
198 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
199 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
200 As one opponent of the law remarked:
This bill takes advantage of the trust that we have placed in this administra-
tion. Our law enforcement and intelligence community have all of the
laws... that they need to do their job .... [T]hey failed us; and now this At-
torney General is using this unfortunate situation to extract extraordinary
powers to be used beyond dealing with terrorism, laws that he will place into
the regular criminal justice system.
147 CONG. REc. H6,763 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Waters).
201 Id. at S10,560 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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visions were never enacted into law prior to passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act because before September l1th, politicians and their
constituents held preserving the constitutional rights of Americans as
their highest priority and most important duty. Demonstrating this
marked change in the political sphere, Senator Leahy discussed ef-
forts "made a few years ago in the Senate to provide law enforcement
with greater tools to conduct surveillance of terrorists and terrorist
organizations" that "would have expanded the Government's author-
ity to conduct emergency wiretaps to cases of domestic or interna-
tional terrorism and added a definition of domestic terrorism"202 simi-
lar to the one found today in the USA PATRIOT Act. That effort was
subsequently tabled. Ironically, current advocates of the USA
PATRIOT Act, including then Senator Ashcroft and Senator Hatch,
were among those who rejected the expansion of governmental sur-
veillance authority. At the time, Senator Hatch stated, "I do not think
we should expand the wiretap laws any further.... We must ensure
that in our response to recent terrorist acts, we do not destroy the
freedoms that we cherish."2 °3 While the task of protecting Americans
from terrorist attacks is clearly more challenging in the wake of the
September 11th attacks, the constitutional rights of Americans must
be no less important to our lawmakers and ourselves in times of crisis
and war than they are during times of peace. As Senator Feingold
reminded the Senate:
[T]here have been periods in our nation's history when civil liberties
have taken a back seat to what appeared at the time to be the legitimate
exigencies of war. Our national consciousness still bears the stain and
the scars of those events: The Alien and Sedition Acts, the suspension of
habeas corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-
Americans, German-Americans, and Italian-Americans during World
War II, the blacklisting of supposed communist sympathizers during the
McCarthy era, and the surveillance and harassment of antiwar protesters,
including Dr. Martin Luther KingJr., during the Vietnam War. We must
not allow these pieces of our past to become prologue .... Now some
may say, indeed we may hope, that we have come a long way since those
days of infringements on civil liberties. But there is ample reason for
concern. And I have been troubled in the past 6 weeks by the potential
202 147 CONG. REc. S10,366 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
The above-mentioned efforts were proposed amendments to the bill that later became
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, offered by Senator Lieber-
man in May 1995. Id.
203 Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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loss of commitment in the Congress and the country to traditional civil
liberties.
2 04
Keeping in mind these dark periods of American history, we must be
alert to the strategic use of fears associated with the recent breach of
homeland security as a means to pass controversial legislation that
would not have survived constitutional scrutiny if considered only days
or months prior to September 11th.
One legitimate reason for Senator Feingold's concern is the speed
with which this significant piece of legislation was pushed through
Congress without allowing sufficient time for the Representatives to
gain a thorough understanding of these important provisions and en-
gage in debate. As Senator Leahy admitted to the Senate during the
formation of the USA PATRIOT Act, "[d]espite my misgivings, I ac-
quiesced in some of the Administration's proposals because it is im-
portant to preserve national unity in this time of national crisis and to
move the legislative process forward."2 °5 While national unity is cer-
tainly essential in times of crisis and war, taking the time to create
amendments to the existing surveillance laws that are worded with suf-
ficient precision to protect the constitutional rights of Americans
would have been the better course for our lawmakers to take. Faced
with warnings of additional terrorist assaults and the fears generated
by the September 11th attacks, it is understandable that the Bush ad-
ministration wanted to accelerate passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Nevertheless, the abridged process' °6 by which the Senate and House
204 147 CONG. REC. S11,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
205 Id. at S10,990 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
206 As Representative Scott remarked:
I think it is appropriate to comment on the process by which the bill is com-
ing to us. This is not the bill that was reported and deliberated on in the
Committee on the Judiciary. It came to use late on the floor. No one has
really had an opportunity to look at the bill to see what is in it since we have
been out of our offices. The report has just come to us. It would be helpful if
we would wait for some period of time so that we can at least review what we
are voting on, but I guess that is not going to stop us, so here we are.
Id. at H7,200 (statement of Rep. Scott). At the same session of the House, Representa-
tive Frank also expressed his
deep disappointment in the procedure .... We now, for the second time, are
debating on the floor a bill of profound significance for the constitutional
structure and security of our country. In neither case has any Member been
allowed to offer a single amendment. This bill, ironically, which has been
given all of these high-flying acronyms, it is the PATRIOT bill, it is the U.S.A.
bill, it is the stand up and sing the Star Spangled Banner bill, has been de-
bated in the most undemocratic way possible, and it is not worthy of this insti-
tution.
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bills were introduced and revised is extremely distressing, considering
the momentous nature of the Act and the broad range of intelligence
and criminal investigations that it will alter forever.
As Representative Goodlatte expressed to the House of Represen-
tatives, "we must be careful not to trade our personal freedoms for the
promise of security. Once we have sacrificed the civil liberties that our
Nation was founded on, then and only then have we allowed terrorism
to defeat us."' 7 Although it is unlikely that the USA PATRIOT Act's
far-reaching extensions of surveillance law would have enabled the
government to prevent the tragedy we witnessed on 'September 1 1th,
2001,208 it is patently apparent how we will all pay the price of a false
sense of security at the cost of cherished freedoms.
Id. at H7,206 (statement of Rep. Frank). Senator Feingold further mentioned that
"the pressure to move on this bill quickly, without deliberation or debate, has been re-
lentless." Id. at 811,020 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
207 Id. at H6,761 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
208 See id. at S10,366 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Let me be clear: No one can
guarantee that Americans will be free from the threat of future terrorist attacks, and to
suggest that this legislation-or any legislation-would or could provide such a guar-
antee would be a false promise.").
